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ROBUSTNESS PROPERTIES IN FICTITIOUS-PLAY-TYPE
ALGORITHMS ∗
BRIAN SWENSON†‡ SOUMMYA KAR† JOA˜O XAVIER‡ DAVID S. LESLIE§
Abstract. Fictitious play (FP) is a canonical game-theoretic learning algorithm which has been
deployed extensively in decentralized control scenarios. However standard treatments of FP, and of
many other game-theoretic models, assume rather idealistic conditions which rarely hold in realistic
control scenarios. This paper considers a broad class of best response learning algorithms, that we
refer to as FP-type algorithms. In such an algorithm, given some (possibly limited) information
about the history of actions, each individual forecasts the future play and chooses a (myopic) best
action given their forecast. We provide a unified analysis of the behavior of FP-type algorithms under
an important class of perturbations, thus demonstrating robustness to deviations from the idealistic
operating conditions that have been previously assumed. This robustness result is then used to de-
rive convergence results for two control-relevant relaxations of standard game-theoretic applications:
distributed (network-based) implementation without full observability and asynchronous deployment
(including in continuous time). In each case the results follow as a direct consequence of the main
robustness result.
Key words. Game Theory, Learning, Multi-agent, Distributed
AMS subject classifications. 93A14, 93A15, 91A06, 91A26, 91A80
1. Introduction. Decentralized control scenarios are naturally modeled using
the framework of game theory [1]. In this context, solution concepts such as Nash or
correlated equilibrium can represent desirable operating conditions for the system. A
game-theoretic learning algorithm is a distributed procedure that allows a group of
agents to cooperatively learn and coordinate their actions on such equilibria.
Fictitious Play (FP) [2] is a canonical game-theoretic learning algorithm—the FP
algorithm, as well as variants thereof, have been studied in a wide range of control
and optimization settings [3–11]. In FP, each player tracks the empirical frequency of
the actions of every other player and uses this information as a (possibly incorrect)
forecast of the future behavior of game play. In particular, each player chooses their
next-stage action as a myopic best response to their forecast.
FP is known to converge to Nash equilibrium (NE) in various classes of games
[12–18], but is known to not always do so [19,20]. Recently there have been efforts to
determine the robustness of game-theoretic approaches to control, even in the absence
of convergence to equilibrium [21–23].
However, standard treatments of FP (as well as many other learning algorithms)
assume that rather idealistic conditions hold [24]. For example, in the traditional
treatment of FP players are assumed to act in perfect synchrony, be capable of
perfectly computing the best response in each stage, and are assumed to have in-
stantaneous access to all information required to compute the best response. Such
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2assumptions are often extremely impractical—particularly, in large-scale distributed
settings. This motivates the study of the robustness of learning results to perturba-
tions occurring in practical real-world scenarios.
The paper studies the robustness of a class of FP-type algorithms in which players
are assumed to track some statistics related to the history of the game (not necessarily
the empirical frequency distribution of classical FP) and form a forecast of opponent
behavior using this information. As in FP, each player chooses their next-stage action
as a myopic best response given their forecast.
Our main theoretical result is to show that FP-type algorithms are robust in the
presence of a certain important class of perturbations. In particular, suppose that the
myopic best response is perturbed so that players may sometimes choose suboptimal
actions, but that the degree of suboptimality decays to zero over time. (In the spirit
of [25], we sometimes call a FP-type process that is perturbed in this manner a
weakened FP-type process.) We show that the fundamental learning property of a
FP-type algorithm is retained in the presence of such a perturbation. In the case of
classical FP, this means that convergence to NE is preserved. More generally, if a
FP-type algorithm converges to some equilibrium set in the absence of perturbations,
then our result can be applied to study convergence to the same equilibrium set in
the presence of perturbations.
Robustness results of this kind were first studied in [26] for the case of classi-
cal FP. The present paper extends the approach of [26] to demonstrate robustness
of FP-type algorithms. This greatly enhances the applicability of game-theoretical
learning theory to real-world control problems. Moreover, the results of this paper
have required the development of useful new technical tools. For example, Lemma
4.2 studies ǫ-best response sequences and demonstrates that such sequences may in
fact be considered in terms of a more amenable sequence of so called δ-perturbations
(see Section 3). In order to demonstrate how the result can be applied to real-world
control problems, we consider two example applications to control scenarios.
As a first application, we study the problem of implementing a FP-type algo-
rithm in a distributed setting. In traditional implementations of FP-type algorithms
it is assumed that players have instantaneous access to the information required to
generate their forecast. However, in practical scenarios this information may often be
distributed among the agents and must be disseminated using an overlaid communi-
cation graph. We present a generic method for implementing a FP-type algorithm in
this setting, and we show that convergence of such an algorithm can be ensured as a
consequence of the robustness result.
Distributed implementations of FP were previously studied in [27]—the robust-
ness result of this paper significantly expands the class of distributed communication
protocols that can be used and extends the results to the class of FP-type algorithms.
In particular, [27] requires that any errors in the system decay at some minimum
rate, whereas the robustness results in this paper do not require a minimum error
decay rate. In communication schemes with channel noise or random link failures, it
may not be possible to achieve the error decay rates needed by [27]. These important
practical scenarios can, however, be handled by the methods developed in this paper.
As a second application, we consider the problem of asynchronous implementa-
tion. In many game-theoretic learning algorithms, it is assumed that players act in
a perfectly synchronous manner. This assumption is unrealistic in large-scale dis-
tributed scenarios where players do not have access to a global clock. We study a
practical variant of FP where players are permitted to choose actions in an asyn-
3chronous manner, and derive a mild condition under which convergence can be shown
to occur.1 The proofs of these results follow as a simple consequence of the robustness
result, and do not require the use of additional stochastic approximation techniques.
Applications of the robustness result are by no means limited to those presented
here. For example, the companion work [29] utilizes the robustness result to develop a
Monte-Carlo based method that significantly mitigates computational burden of FP,
and [30] use the robustness result to develop a variant of FP that achieves convergence
in strategic intentions [31].
The selected applications are intended to serve as a sample of the manner in which
the robustness result can be applied. Each of these applications has been studied in
a variety of contexts, e.g., [5, 27, 29, 32–36]. In this paper, we demonstrate how they
can be treated in a unified manner and demonstrate how the robustness result can
advance the state of the art in each.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the nota-
tion. Section 3 sets up the mathematical tools to be used in the proof of the main
theoretical result. Section 4 presents the notion of a FP-type algorithm, and presents
our robustness result. Section 5 presents an example FP-type process in the context
of the robustness result. Section 6 studies distributed implementation and Section 7
studies asynchronous implementation. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. Preliminaries. A game in normal form is represented by the tuple Γ :=
(N , (Yi, ui)i∈N ), where N = {1, . . . , N} denotes the set of players, Yi denotes the
finite set of actions available to player i, and ui :
∏
i∈N Yi → R denotes the utility
function of player i. Denote by Y :=
∏
i∈N Yi the joint action space.
For a finite set X , let ∆(X) denote the set of probability distributions over X .
In particular, let ∆(Yi) be the set of mixed strategies available to player i, let ∆(Y−i)
be the set of mixed strategies (possibly correlated) available to all players other than
i, and let ∆(Y ) denote the set of joint mixed strategies (possibly correlated) available
to all players.
In large scale distributed settings it is often convenient to study mixed strategies
where players act independently. Denote by ∆N :=
∏
i∈N ∆(Yi) the set of (indepen-
dent) joint mixed strategies. That is, a strategy2 p = (p1, . . . , pN ) ∈ ∆N—where
pi denotes the marginal strategy of player i—may be represented in the space ∆(Y )
as the product
∏N
i=1 pi ∈ ∆(Y ). In this context we define ∆−i :=
∏
j 6=i∆j to be
the set of (independent) mixed strategies of players other than i. When convenient,
we represent a mixed strategy p ∈ ∆N by p = (pi, p−i), where pi ∈ ∆i denotes the
marginal strategy of player i and p−i = (p1, . . . , pN)\pi ∈ ∆−i =
∏
j 6=i∆j denotes
the strategies of players other than i.
In the context of mixed strategies, we often wish to retain the notion of playing
a single deterministic action. For this purpose, let 1yi denote the mixed strategy
placing probability one on the action yi ∈ Yi.
1We remark that while these applications are interesting in and of themselves, additional util-
ity may be gained by considering them in conjunction with one another. For example, the first
application allows for synchronous distributed implementation and the second allows for generic
asynchronous implementation. Together, they allow one to study asynchronous distributed im-
plementation of a FP-type algorithm, using, for example, asynchronous gossip [28] as a means of
disseminating information amongst agents.
2As a matter of convention, we use the letters p and q when referring to strategies in ∆N
throughout the paper.
4For x ∈ ∆(Y ), the expected utility of player i is given by
Ui(x) :=
∑
y∈Y
ui(y)x(y1, . . . , yn),
and for p ∈ ∆N , the expected utility of player i is given by
Ui(p) :=
∑
y∈Y ui(y)p1(y1) . . . pN (yN ).
Given a strategy x−i ∈ ∆(Y−i), define the best response set for player i by
BRi(x−i) := argmaxxi∈∆(Yi) Ui(xi, x−i), and more generally, the ǫ-best-response set
is given by
BRi,ǫ(x−i) := {x˜i ∈ ∆(Yi) : Ui(x˜i, x−i) ≥ max
xi∈∆(Yi)
Ui(xi, x−i)− ǫ}. (2.1)
To keep notation simple, we sometimes employ the following abuses. The notation
yi ∈ BRi,ǫ(x−i) means that 1yi ∈ BRi,ǫ(x−i). Similarly, for yi ∈ Yi the notation
Ui(yi, x−i) refers to the expected utility Ui(1yi , x−i).
The set of Nash equilibria is given by
NE := {p ∈ ∆N : Ui(pi, p−i) ≥ Ui(p′i, p−i), ∀p
′
i ∈ ∆(Yi), ∀i ∈ N}.
The distance between a point x ∈ Rm and a set S ⊂ Rm is given by d(x, S) =
inf{‖x − x′‖ : x′ ∈ S}. Throughout the paper ‖ · ‖ denotes the L2 Euclidean norm
unless otherwise specified. We let N := {0, 1, 2, . . .} denote the non-negative integers,
and N+ := {1, 2, . . .} denote the positive integers.
Throughout, we assume the existence of probability spaces rich enough to carry
out the construction of the various random variables required. As a matter of con-
vention, all equalities, inequalities, and set inclusions involving random quantities are
interpreted almost surely (a.s.) with respect to the underlying probability measure,
unless otherwise stated.
2.1. Repeated Play. Unless otherwise stated, the learning algorithms consid-
ered in this paper all assume the following format of repeated play [31, 37]. Let a
normal form game Γ be fixed. Let players repeatedly face off in the game Γ, and for
n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, let σi(n) ∈ ∆(Yi) denote the strategy used by player i in round n. Let
the N -tuple σ(n) = (σ1(n), . . . , σN (n)) ∈ ∆N denote the joint strategy at time n.
3. Difference Inclusions and Differential Inclusions. In this section we
introduce the mathematical tools necessary to prove our main theoretical result.
In particular, in Section 4 we will study the limiting behavior of a (discrete-time)
FP-type process by first studying the behavior of a continuous-time analog and then
relating the limit sets of the the (discrete-time) FP-type process to the limit sets of
its continuous-time counterpart.
Following the approach of [38], let F : Rm ⇒ Rm denote a set-valued function
mapping each point ξ ∈ Rm to a set F (ξ) ⊆ Rm. We assume:
A. 1. (i) F is a closed set-valued map.3
(ii) F (ξ) is a nonempty compact convex subset of Rm for all ξ ∈ Rm.
(iii) For some norm ‖ · ‖ on Rm, there exists c > 0 such that for all ξ ∈ Rm,
supη∈F (ξ) ‖η‖ ≤ c(1 + ‖ξ‖).
Definition 3.1. A solution for the differential inclusion dxdt ∈ F (x) with initial
point ξ ∈ Rm is an absolutely continuous mapping x : R → Rm such that x(0) = ξ
and dx(t)dt ∈ F (x(t)) for almost every t ∈ R.
3I.e., Graph(F ) := {(ξ, η) : η ∈ F (ξ)} is a closed subset of Rm × Rm.
5In order to study the asymptotic behavior of discrete-time processes in this con-
text, one may study the continuous-time interpolation. Formally, we define the
continuous-time interpolation as follows:
Definition 3.2. Consider the discrete-time process
x(n+ 1)− x(n) ∈ γ(n+ 1)F (x(n)).
Set τ0 = 0 and τn =
∑n
i=1 γ(i) for n ≥ 1 and define the continuous-time interpolated
process w : [0,∞)→ Rm by
w(τn + s) = x(n) + s
x(n+ 1)− x(n)
τn+1 − τn
, s ∈ [0, γ(n+ 1)).
In general, the continuous-time interpolation of a discrete-time process will not itself
be a precise solution for the differential inclusion as stated in Definition 3.1. However,
the interpolated process may be shown to satisfy the more relaxed solution concept—
namely, that of a perturbed solution to the differential inclusion. We first define the
notion of a δ-perturbation which we then use to define the notion of a perturbed
solution.
Definition 3.3. Let F : Rm ⇒ Rm be a set-valued map, and let δ > 0. The
δ-perturbation of F is given by
F
δ(x) := {y ∈ Rm : ∃z ∈ Rm s.t. ‖z − x‖ < δ, d(y,F (z)) < δ}.
Definition 3.4. A continuous function y : [0,∞) → Rm will be called a per-
turbed solution to F if it satisfies the following set of conditions:
(i) y is absolutely continuous.
(ii) dy(t)dt ∈ F
δ(t)(y(t)) for almost every t > 0, for some function δ : [0,∞)→ R with
δ(t)→ 0 as t→∞.
The following proposition gives sufficient conditions under which an interpolated
process will in fact be a perturbed solution.
Proposition 1. Consider a discrete-time process {x(n)}n≥1 such that
γ(n)−1 (x(n+ 1)− x(n)) ∈ F δn(x(n)) where {γ(n)}n≥1 is a sequence of positive num-
bers such that γ(n)→ 0 and
∑∞
n=1 γ(n) =∞, {δn}n≥1 is a sequence of non-negative
numbers converging to 0, and supn ‖x(n)‖ <∞. Then the continuous-time interpola-
tion of {x(n)}n≥1 is a perturbed solution of F .
The proof of Proposition 1 follows similar reasoning to the proof of Proposition
1.3 in [38].
Our end goal is to characterize the set of limit points of the discrete-time process
{x(n)}n≥1 by characterizing the set of limit points of its continuous-time interpolation.
With that end in mind, it is useful to consider the notion of a chain-recurrent set—a
set of natural limit points for perturbed processes.
Definition 3.5. Let ‖·‖ be a norm on Rm, and let F : Rm ⇒ Rm be a set valued
map satisfying A. 1. Consider the differential inclusion
dx
dt
∈ F (x). (3.1)
(a) Given a set X ⊂ Rm and points ξ and η, we write ξ →֒ η if for every ǫ > 0 and
T > 0 there exist an integer n∗ ≥ 1, solutions x1, . . . , xn∗ to the differential inclusion
(3.1), and real numbers t1, . . . , tn∗ greater than T such that
6(i) xi(s) ∈ X, for all 0 ≤ s ≤ ti and for all i = 1, . . . , n∗,
(ii) ‖xi(ti)− xi+1(0)‖ ≤ ǫ for all i = 1, . . . , n∗ − 1,
(iii) ‖x1(0)− ξ‖ ≤ ǫ and ‖xn∗(tn∗)− η‖ ≤ ǫ.
(b) X is said to be internally chain recurrent if X is compact and ξ →֒ ξ′ for all
ξ, ξ′ ∈ X.
The following theorem from [38] allows one to relate the set of limit points of a
perturbed solution of F to the internally chain recurrent sets F .
Theorem 3.6 ( [38], Theorem 3.6). Let y be a bounded perturbed solution to F .
Then the limit set of y, L(y) =
⋂
t≥0 {y(s) : s ≥ t} is internally chain recurrent.
In order to eventually prove Theorem 4.1 (in the following section) we will show
that the continuous-time interpolation of a FP-type process is in fact a bounded
perturbed solution to the associated differential inclusion (4.5), and hence by Theorem
3.6, the limit points of the FP-type process are contained in the internally chain
recurrent sets of the associated differential inclusion.
4. Fictitious-Play-Type Process. In this section we will formally define the
general framework of FP-type processes, and demonstrate how this encompasses sev-
eral existing learning procedures. We will then introduce the weakening of FP-type
processes which allows consideration of robustness to perturbations, before proving
general convergence properties of the framework.
We begin by reviewing the classical FP algorithm.
4.1. Fictitious Play. Define the empirical history distribution (or empirical
distribution) of player i by
qi(n) :=
1
n
n∑
s=1
σi(s), (4.1)
where {σi(s)} is a strategy sequence as defined in Section 2.1, and let the joint empir-
ical distribution profile (or just joint empirical distribution) be given by the N -tuple
q(n) = (q1(n), . . . , qN (n)) ∈ ∆N . A sequence of strategies {σ(n)}n≥1 is said to be a
fictitious play process if for all i ∈ N and n ≥ 1,4
σi(n+ 1) ∈ BRi(q−i(n)). (4.2)
In a FP process, it may be interpreted that players track the (marginal) empirical
distribution of the actions of each opponent and treat this empirical distribution as
a prediction (or forecast) of the future (mixed) strategy of that opponent. Players
choose their next-stage actions as a myopic best response given this prediction.
In what follows, we will see that a FP-type algorithm generalizes this idea—players
will still form a forecast and choose their next-stage action as a myopic best response,
but the manner in which the forecast can be formed will be significantly generalized.
4.2. FP-Type Process.
A FP-type algorithm generalizes FP in two ways: (i) Players are permitted to
track and react to a function of the empirical history and, (ii) players consider an
empirical history that may be non-uniformly weighted over time.5
4The initial strategy σ(1) may be chosen arbitrarily.
5The class of FP-type algorithms considered here is similar to the class of best-response algorithms
considered in [20].
7In particular, let Z denote a compact subset of Rm for some m ∈ N+ where
the information that players keep track of is assumed to live. We refer to Z as the
observation space. Let
g : ∆(Y )→ Z
be a map from the joint mixed strategy space to the observation space. We assume
the following
A. 2. The observation map g is uniformly continuous.
Let {z(n)}n≥1 be a sequence in Z that is defined recursively by letting z(1) ∈ Z
be arbitrary and for n ≥ 1
z(n+ 1) = z(n) + γ(n) (g(σ(n+ 1))− z(n)) , (4.3)
where {γ(n)}n≥1 is a predefined sequence of weights satisfying
A. 3. limn→∞ γ(n) = 0,
∑
n≥1 γ(n) = ∞. We refer to z(n) as the observation
state (the state z(n) plays an analogous role to the empirical distribution q(n) in clas-
sical FP). In a FP-type algorithm, each player forms a prediction (or forecast) of the
future behavior of opponents as a function of the observation state z(n). In particular,
for each player i, let fi : Z → ∆(Y−i) be a function mapping from the observation
state to a forecast of opponents strategies. We make the following assumption
A. 4. The forecast map fi is continuous for each i ∈ N .
Given f = (f1, . . . , fN), we define the best-response function BRf : Z → ∆(Y )
associated with a FP-type algorithm as BRf (z) =
∏N
i=1 BRi(fi(z)), where BRi is as
defined in Section 2.
When players are engaged in repeated play, we say the sequence {z(n)}n≥1 is
a FP-type process if each player’s stage (n + 1) strategy is chosen as a myopic
best response given their prediction of opponents strategies. That is, σi(n + 1) ∈
BRi(fi(z(n))), ∀i, ∀n; or equivalently in recursive form (see (4.3))
z(n+ 1)− z(n) ∈ γ(n) (g(BRf (z(n)))− z(n)) .
Example 1. Classical FP is recovered by letting γ(n) = 1n+1 , letting the observa-
tion space be given by Z = ∆N , letting g : ∆(Y )→ ∆N with g(z) = (g1(z), . . . , gN(z)),
where gi : ∆(Y )→ ∆(Yi) is given by gi(x) =
∑
y−i∈Y−i
x(yi, y−i), and for each i let-
ting fi : ∆
N → ∆(Y−i) with fi(z) = (z1, . . . , zi−1, zi+1 . . . , zN ).
Example 2. Joint Strategy FP [4] is recovered by letting γ(n) = 1n+1 , setting
the observations space to be Z = ∆(Y ), letting g : ∆(Y ) → ∆(Y ) to be the identity
function and letting fi : ∆(Y )→ ∆(Y−i) be given by fi(z) =
∑
yi∈Yi
z(yi, y−i).
Example 3. Suppose all players use an identical action space given by Yi =
Y¯ , ∀i. In this case, Empirical Centroid FP (ECFP) [27] is recovered by letting γ(n) =
1
n+1 , letting the observation space be given by Z = ∆(Y¯ ), letting g : ∆(Y ) → ∆(Y¯ )
be given by g(x) = N−1
∑N
i=1 xi where yi 7→ xi(yi) =
∑
y−i∈Y−i
x(yi, y−i), and letting
fi : ∆(Y¯ ) → ∆(Y−i) be given by fi(z) = (z, . . . , z), i.e., the (n − 1)-tuple containing
repeated copies of z.6
We denote an instance of a FP-type algorithm as Ψ = ({γ(n)}n≥1, g, (fi)ni=1).
6The ECFP algorithm is explored in more depth in Section 5 in connection with the robustness
result.
84.3. Weakened Fictitious-Play-Type Process. In a FP-type algorithm it is
assumed that players actions are always chosen as optimal (best response) strategies—
a strong assumption. In the spirit of [25, 26], we wish to study the robustness of the
convergence of a FP-type algorithm in a setting where agents may sometimes choose
suboptimal actions. As we will see in later sections, this relaxation allows for a breadth
of practical applications.
Formally, let the ǫ-best response in this context be given by BRf,ǫ : Z → ∆(Y ),
where BRf,ǫ(z) :=
∏N
i=1BRi,ǫ(fi(z)), and where BRi,ǫn is as defined in (2.1). Sup-
pose that players choose their next-stage strategies as
σ(n+ 1) ∈ BRf,ǫn(z(n)), (4.4)
where we assume the sequence {ǫn}n≥1 satisfies
A. 5. limn→∞ ǫn = 0. We refer to the sequence {ǫn}n≥1 in (4.4) as a best-
response perturbation. We refer to a sequence of strategies {σ(n)}n≥1 satisfying (4.4)
as a weakened FP-type process (cf. [25, 26]).
4.4. Main Theoretical Result: Robustness Property for FP-Type Pro-
cess. The following theorem is the main theoretical result of the paper. It shows
that if A. 2–A. 5 are satisfied, then the set of limit points of a discrete-time FP-type
process are contained in a chain-recurrent set of the associated differential inclusion
z˙(t) ∈ g(BRf (z(t))− z(t). (4.5)
Theorem 4.1. Let Ψ = ({γ(n)}n≥1, g, (fi)ni=1) be a FP-type algorithm. Assume
that Ψ satisfies A. 2–A. 4. Assume that any best-response perturbation satisfies A. 5.
Then a weakened FP-type process converges to the chain recurrent set of the associated
differential inclusion (4.5).
After proving the theorem, we give an example of how the theorem can be applied
to study various notions of learning in the case of a particular FP-type algorithm (see
Section 5).
The proof of Theorem 4.1 follows directly from the following lemma together with
Proposition 1 and Theorem 3.6. The lemma shows that for sufficiently small ǫ the
ǫ-best responses are contained in the δ-perturbations of BR for all z. While this
is clearly true pointwise, the uniformity in z has not previously been shown. This
observation was not made in [26] and results in a gap in the proof presented there.
Lemma 4.2. Let ǫn → 0 as n → ∞. Then there exists a sequence δn → 0 such
that BRf,ǫn(z) ⊆ BR
δn
f (z) uniformly for z ∈ Z.
Proof. We work with the supremum norm on Z and ∆(Yi) throughout the proof.
Fix an arbitrary δ > 0. Following [39], define the “stability set” of a (joint) action
y ∈ Y as
St(y) := {z ∈ Z : yi ∈ BRi(fi(z)), ∀i}.
Note that the closer that z is to boundary of St(y), the smaller that ǫmust be to ensure
that ǫ-best responses place large mass on y, and hence are δ-perturbations of y =
BR(z). To gain the uniform inclusion of the ǫ-best responses in the δ-perturbations
we consider the interior of the sets St(y) separately from neighbourhoods of boundaries
of the stability sets. To this end, extend the stability set concept to sets of actions
T ⊆ Y by defining
St(T ) :=
⋂
y∈T
St(y)
9to be the set of z ∈ Z such that all actions y ∈ T are best responses to z. In what
follows, we will use the stability sets St(T ) to construct a finite cover {D(T )}T⊆Y of
Z such that BR(f(z)) ⊆ T for each z ∈ D(T ). This allows us to show that ǫ-best
responses to elements in D(T ) place most of their mass on T , and in particular it can
be shown that for each set D(T ) ⊆ Z there holds
BRf,ǫ(z) ⊆ BR
δ
f (z), for all z ∈ D(T ) (4.6)
for all ǫ sufficiently small. Since the cover is finite, we can show that in fact
BRf,ǫ(z) ⊆ BR
δ
f (z), for all z ∈ Z (4.7)
holds for all ǫ sufficiently small. (We note, however, that we proceed along a slightly
more direct route, showing (4.7) without directly verifying (4.6).)
To this end, note that by the upper hemicontinuity of BRi and continuity of
fi, we have that St(y) and St(T ) are closed sets. For any η > 0 and any T ⊆ Y ,
let B(St(T ), η) be the open ball of radius η about St(T ) which is empty if St(T ) is
empty. Let M =
∏
i∈N |Yi| and for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} let T
k be the collection of
all subsets T ⊆ Y such that |T | = k. For the tuple η>k = (ηk+1, . . . , ηM ) define the
“exclusion set”
Ek(η>k) :=
M⋃
κ=k+1
⋃
T∈T κ
B(St(T ), ηκ)
to be the set of z ∈ Z that are close to any stability sets St(T ) with |T | > k, where
close is measured by the tuple η>k.
We now work recursively from k = M down to k = 1. Start by letting ηM = δ
and let
D(Y ) := B(St(Y ), ηM ).
Now let k ∈ {1, . . . ,M−1} and suppose η>k is given. Suppose T ∈ T k, and let T˜ ⊆ Y
such that T˜ 6⊆ T. Then |T ∪ T˜ | > k, so by the definition of Ek(η>k) we have that
St(T ) ∩ St(T˜ ) = St(T ∪ T˜ ) ⊆ Ek(η>k). Therefore St(T ) ∩ St(T˜ ) ∩ Ek(η>k)c = ∅.
Since Ek(η>k) is open by definition, the complement is closed. Therefore the sets
St(T ) ∩ Ek(η>k)
c and St(T˜ ) are disjoint compact sets and either have a minimal
separating distance or at least one is empty. We can therefore fix an ηk such that, for
each T ∈ T k,
D(T ) := B(St(T ), ηk) ∩ E
k(η>k)
c
is separated from
1. St(T˜ ) for all T˜ ⊆ Y such that T˜ 6⊆ T , and
2. D(T˜ ) for all T˜ ∈ T k with T˜ 6= T .
Iterating this reasoning down to k = 1 defines the full set of ηk values as well as D(T )
for all T ⊆ Y with T 6= ∅.
We now show that the sets {D(T )}T⊆Y partition Z. By definition we have that
D(Y ) = B(St(Y ), ηM ); using a backwards induction argument one may verify that
M⋃
k=1
⋃
T∈T k
D(T ) =
M⋃
k=1
⋃
T∈T k
B(St(T ), ηk). (4.8)
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Hence, Z =
⋃
T⊆Y St(T ) ⊆
⋃
T⊆Y D(T ) ⊆ Z, where the equality holds because
there exists a best response to any z ∈ Z, and the first containment holds by (4.8).
Furthermore, by property 2) above (and the fact that, by construction,D(T )∩D(T˜ ) =
∅ for |T | 6= |T˜ |) we have that D(T ) ∩D(T˜ ) = ∅, ∀T, T˜ ⊆ Y, T˜ 6= T . Hence the sets
{D(T )}T⊆Y partition Z.
We wish to show that for z ∈ D(T ), the ǫ-best responses place most of their mass
on elements in T . To this end, let T ∈ T k for arbitrary 1 ≤ k ≤M , and let D¯(T ) be
the closure of D(T ). We claim that if z ∈ D¯(T ), then all pure strategy best responses
to z are contained in T . To see this, suppose contrariwise that z ∈ D¯(T ) has a pure
strategy best response not contained in T . Then z ∈ St(T˜ ) for some T˜ 6⊆ T , which
violates Property 1) above.
Now define, for z ∈ Z, the set T (z) to be the T ⊆ Y such that z ∈ D(T ). Also
define Ti(z) := {yi ∈ Yi : (yi, y−i) ∈ T (z) for some y−i ∈ Y−i}, so that all of Player
i’s pure strategy best responses to z ∈ Z are contained in Ti(z). Thus, for z ∈ D¯(T ),
for each i there exists a ξi,δ(z) > 0 such that
max
yi∈Yi
Ui(1yi , f(z))− max
y˜i 6∈Ti(z)
Ui(1y˜i , f(z)) = ξi,δ(z).
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Since D¯(T ) is compact and Ui (and hence ξi) is continuous, we get inf
p∈D¯(T )
ξi,δ(z) > 0,
∀i. Since there are finitely many T ⊆ Y and i ∈ N , there exists a ξδ > 0 such that for
each i and z ∈ Z, maxyi∈Yi Ui(1yi , fi(z)) −maxy˜i /∈Ti(z) Ui(1y˜i , fi(z)) ≥ ξδ. We have
shown that for any i and any z, any action not in Ti(z) receives utility less than the
best response by at least an amount ξδ.
Invoking the linearity of zi 7→ Ui(zi, z−i), it follows that for z ∈ Z, for each i, an
ǫ-best response to z can put probability at most ǫ/ξδ on actions not in Ti(z). That
is, for any z ∈ Z and for any i ∈ N ,
BRi,ǫ(fi(z)) ⊆
{
xi ∈ ∆(Yi) :
∑
yi∈Ti(z)
zi(yi) ≥ 1−
ǫ
ξδ
}
.
Let ǫ ≤ min{δξδ, δ} and let x ∈ BRf,ǫ(z). By the above, x is a distance at
most δ from a strategy x′ which places all its mass on T (z). Simultaneously, by the
construction of D(T ), z is a distance at most δ from the set St(T (z)); i.e., there exists
a z′ ∈ St(T (z)) such that d(z, z′) ≤ δ. By the definition of the stability set, we have
x′ ∈ BRf (z′). This shows that x ∈ BRδf (z). Since z was arbitrary, and this holds for
any x ∈ BRf,ǫ(z) we have BRf,ǫ(z) ⊆ BRδf (z), for all z ∈ Z. Since this holds for
any ǫ ≤ min{δξδ, δ}, it follows that for any sequence ǫn → 0 there exists a sequence
δn → 0 such that BRf,ǫn(z) ⊆ BR
δn
f (z) for any z ∈ Z.
We now prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof. By assumption, players choose their strategies according to (4.4). Applying
(4.3) we get the recursive form γ(n)−1(z(n+1)−z(n)) ∈ g(BRf,ǫn(z(n)))−z(n), where
ǫn → 0. By Lemma 4.2, we know that γ(n)−1(z(n+1)−z(n)) ∈ g(BR
δn
f (z(n)))−z(n)
for some sequence δn → 0. Let F : Z ⇒ Z be given by F (z) = g(BRf (z)) − z.
Since g is uniformly continuous, the previous equation implies that γ(n)−1(z(n+1)−
z(n)) ∈ F ηn(z(n)) for some sequence ηn → 0. By Proposition 1, the continuous-
time interpolation of {z(n)}n≥1 is a bounded perturbed solution to the associated
differential inclusion (4.5). The result then follows by Theorem 3.6.
7For completeness we emphasize that ξi,δ is in fact a function of δ, as well as z.
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An important consequence of Theorem 4.1 is that, if one wishes to show conver-
gence of a FP-type algorithm to some equilibrium set, one need only verify that the
associated chain recurrent set is contained in the equilibrium set.
This has been shown, for example, with the set of NE and classical FP in potential
games [38], two-player zero-sum games [40], and generic 2×m games [14]. Thus, the
following important result ( [26], Corollary 5) may also be seen as a consequence
of Theorem 4.1. As this result will arise in the subsequent discussion, we find it
convenient to state it here.
Corollary 1 ( [26], Corollary 5). Let Γ be a potential game, two-player zero-sum
game, or generic 2 ×m game. Assume that any best-response perturbation satisfies
A. 5. Then the corresponding FP process converges to the set of NE in the sense that
limn→∞ d(q(n), NE) = 0.
5. Example: Empirical Centroid Fictitious Play. In classical FP each
player i is required to track the marginal empirical distribution zj , j 6= i of every
other player (see (4.2)). The memory size of this vector (that must be tracked by
each player) grows linearly with the number of players. In large-scale settings it can
be impractical for players to track such a large quantity of information.
In this section we consider a variant of FP in which players only track an aggregate
statistic which preserves some (though not necessarily all) of the relevant information
about the game action history. In the spirit of a FP-type algorithm, players form a
prediction of the future behavior of opponents using the aggregate statistic.
In order to ensure the process is well defined, assume that8
A. 6. All players use an identical action space Y¯ ; i.e., Yi = Y¯ , ∀i. Moreover, all
players use an identical permutation-invariant utility function. More details regard-
ing this class of games and the manner in which this assumption can be weakened
can be found in [27].
In ECFP, players track and best respond to the empirical centroid distribution
q¯(n) ∈ ∆N , defined as q¯(n) := 1N
∑N
i=1 qi(n), where qi(n) is as defined in (4.1). In
particular, each player i chooses their next-stage strategy according to the rule
σi(n) ∈ BRi(q¯−i(n− 1)), (5.1)
where q¯−i(n) ∈ ∆(Y−i) is given by q¯−i(n) := (q¯(n), . . . , q¯(n)), i.e., the (n − 1)-tuple
containing repeated copies of q¯(n).
Two notions of learning have been studied for ECFP. Note that both use ECFP
dynamics, but achieve different learning results by using different observation spaces.
Below, we briefly review each notion in the context of the robustness result.
In order to study the first notion of learning we make the following assignments
to terms from Section 4. Let γ(n) = 1n+1 , let Z = ∆(Y¯ ), let g : ∆(Y ) → ∆(Y¯ )
be given by g(z) = N−1
∑N
i=1 zi, where yi 7→ zi(yi) =
∑
y−i∈Y−i
zi(yi, y−i), and let
fi : ∆(Y¯ ) → ∆(Y ) be given by fi(x) = (x, . . . , x), i.e., the (n − 1)-tuple containing
repeated copies of x. Note that the induced dynamics comport with (5.1).
For strategies p ∈ ∆N , we define the set of consensus Nash equilibria (CNE) by
CNE := {p ∈ NE : p1 = . . . = pN}. Define CNE := {p¯ ∈ ∆(Y¯ ) : p = (p¯, . . . , p¯) ∈
NE}, and note that a strategy p ∈ ∆N is a CNE if and only if there exists a p¯ ∈ CNE
such that p = (p¯, . . . , p¯).
8For the ease in exposition, ECFP is presented here in its most basic form. A more general form
of ECFP is discussed in [27] where this assumption may be relaxed.
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It has been shown in [41] that the chain recurrent sets of the associated differential
inclusion (4.5) are contained in the CNE set. We thus obtain the following corollary
to Theorem 4.1:
Corollary 2. Let Γ satisfy A. 6. Suppose players are engaged in a repeated
play process on Γ and choose their next stage actions according to the rule (5.1).
Then players learn CNE strategies in the sense that limn→∞ d(z(n), CNE) = 0, or
equivalently limn→∞ d(z
N (n), CNE) = 0 where zN(n) = (z(n), . . . , z(n)) is the N -
tuple containing repeated copies of z(n).
In order to study the second notion of learning we let γ(n) = 1n+1 , let Z = ∆
N ,
let g : ∆(Y ) → ∆N be given by g(z) = (g1(z), . . . , gN(z)), where gi : ∆(Y ) 7→ ∆(Y¯ )
with gi(z) =
∑
y−i∈Y−i
z(yi, y−i), and let fi : ∆
N → ∆(Y ) be given by fi(z) =∏N
i=1 z¯i, where z¯i(yi) = N
−1
∑N
j=1 zj(yi), yi ∈ Y¯ . Note that the induced dynamics
again comport with (5.1). In this case, note that the observation state lives in ∆N
and corresponds to the standard time-averaged empirical distribution familiar from
classical FP.
For a strategy p = (p1, . . . , pN) ∈ ∆N , define p¯ := N−1
∑N
i=1 pi ∈ ∆(Y¯ ), and
define p¯−i :=
∏
j 6=i p¯ ∈ ∆(Y−i). Let the set of Mean-Centric Equilibria be defined
by MCE := {p ∈ ∆N : Ui(pi, p¯−i) ≥ Ui(p′i, p¯−i), ∀p
′
i ∈ ∆(Y¯ )}. It has been shown
in [41] that the chain recurrent sets of the associated differential inclusion (4.5) are
contained in the set of MCE. Invoking Theorem 1 we obtain a second mode of learning
as stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Let Γ satisfy A. 6. Suppose players are engaged in a repeated play
process on Γ and choose their next stage actions according to the rule (5.1). Then
players learn MCE strategies in the sense that limn→∞ d(z(n),MCE) = 0.
6. Application: Distributed Implementation of a FP-Type Algorithm.
In the formulation of FP, as well as the FP-type algorithm, it is implicitly assumed
that each agent has instantaneous access to all information required to compute her
next-stage action. For example, in classical FP (Section 4.1) each agent is assumed to
have perfect knowledge of the empirical distribution q(n) (see (4.1)) in order to choose
an action in stage n + 1. This assumption can be impractical in large-scale settings
where physical limitations may hinder agents’ ability to directly communicate with
one another.
One approach to mitigate this problem is to assume that agents are equipped
with an overlaid communication graph through which information may be gradually
disseminated through the course of the learning process [27, 33, 42]. In particular,
suppose the following assumption holds:
A. 7. Agents may observe only their own actions. However, agents are equipped
with a (possibly sparse) interagent communication graph G = (V , E). Agents may
exchange information with neighboring agents (as defined by the graph G) once per
iteration of the repeated play.
Within this framework, agents engaged in a FP-type process may not have perfect
knowledge of the observation state z(n). Instead, let zˆi(n) be an estimate that agent
i maintains of z(n).
A prototypical distributed implementation of a FP-type algorithm is given below.
6.1. Distributed FP-Type Algorithm.
Initialize
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(i) Initialize the state estimate zˆi(1).9 Let players choose an arbitrary initial action.
Iterate (n ≥ 1)
(ii) Each agent i chooses a next-stage strategy according to the rule σi(n + 1) ∈
BRi(fi(zˆ
i(n)), where fi(·) satisfies A. 4. The (true) observation state at time (n+1)
is given by z(n + 1) = z(n) + γ(n) (g(σi(n+ 1))− z(n)). (It is not assumed that
players have knowledge of (z(n)).)
(iii) Each agent i may engage in one round of information exchange with neighboring
agents (as defined by G) and update their estimate zˆi(n + 1) using the information
obtained.
6.2. Discussion. Analysis of the the above algorithm prototype reveals that
step (ii) may be seen as a best response perturbation (this follows from the Lipschitz
continuity of Ui). It is straightforward to show that if ‖zˆ
i(n) − z(n)‖ → 0, ∀i, as
n → ∞ then A. 5 holds, and hence the process falls under the purview of Theorem
4.1.
This has been applied, for example, in order to develop distributed implementa-
tions of FP and ECFP [27] where the update of the empirical distribution estimate
in step (iii) is carried out using a type of (synchronous) consensus recursion [28].
We note, however, that the convergence results for the distributed algorithms in [27]
relies on an alternative form of the robustness property which required strong as-
sumptions. In particular, it was required that error in players estimates decay as
‖zˆi(n)− z(n)‖ = O( log ttr ), r > 0.
The robustness result in this paper relies on the significantly weaker assumption
that ‖zˆi(n)− z(n)‖ → 0 (cf. A. 5); in particular, the rate at which this goes to zero
does not matter.
The protocol used to form the estimate zˆi(n) in step (iv) is intentionally crafted
to be broad in order to emphasize that a wide variety of information dissemination
protocols may be used. Using the more powerful robustness result of this paper one
may extend the approach of [27], demonstrating convergence of distributed imple-
mentations of FP-type algorithms in settings where players use more realistic com-
munication protocols—e.g., asynchronous gossip [28] (cf., Section 7), a communication
framework in which the communication graph suffers from random link dropouts [43],
or otherwise changing topology [44].
7. Application: Asynchronous Implementation of Fictitious Play. The
classical FP algorithm (4.2) implicitly assumes a form of global synchronization. In
particular, note that each agent must choose their stage n action before any other
agent chooses their stage (n + 1) action. In practice, such synchronization is often
infeasible in large-scale distributed systems.
In this section we use the robustness result to study a variant of FP in which
agents are permitted to act in an asynchronous manner. While asynchronous learn-
ing schemes would usually be analysed using asynchronous stochastic approximation
(e.g. [35]) we show in this section that asynchronicity can be handled in a more
straightforward manner by simply using our robustness results. In particular, using
Theorem 4.1 we develop a mild sufficient condition under which an “asynchronous FP
process” can be shown to converge to the set of NE in the same sense as classical FP.
9The initialization of zˆi(n) may be subject to some conditions depending on the particular
information dissemination scheme used [27, 28]. See discussion below for more details.
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The initial model of asynchronous FP that we study in Section 7.2 is somewhat
abstract—it is this feature that allows us to capture a broad range of asynchronous
processes. After introducing this model and proving convergence results (Section 7.2),
we then provide simple examples of highly practical real world models that readily
fall within this framework (Sections 7.3-7.5).
We begin by introducing the notion of asynchronous repeated play learning—a
slight modification of classical repeated play introduced in Section 2.1.
7.1. Asynchronous Repeated Play Learning. In order to model asynchrony,
we consider an extension of the classical repeated play framework of Section 2.1 in
which players may be “active” in some rounds and “idle” in others.
Let n ∈ N, and let {Xi(n)}n≥1, be a sequence of (deterministic or random)
variables Xi(n) ∈ {0, 1} indicating the rounds in which player i is active. Let Ni(n)
count the number of rounds in which player i has been active up to and including
time n; i.e., Ni(n) :=
∑n
s=1Xi(s). Let σi(n) represent the strategy chosen by player
i in round n. Let the empirical distribution of player i be defined in this setting as
qi(n) :=
1
Ni(n)
∑n
s=1 σi(s)Xi(s).
7.2. Fictitious Play with Asynchronous Updates. Within the generalized
repeated-play framework given above, we say a sequence of strategies {σ(n)}n≥1 is a
FP process with asynchronous updates (or asynchronous FP process) if for n ≥ 1,10
σi(n+ 1) ∈
{
BRi(q−i(n)) if Xi(n+ 1) = 1,
σi(n) otherwise.
(7.1)
This models a scenario in which each player i may update her action in round (n+1)
according to traditional best-response dynamics only if Xi(n+ 1) = 1; otherwise, the
action of player i persists from the previous round. 11
As a consequence of Corollary 1, the following assumption is sufficient (to be
shown) to ensure that the FP process defined in (7.1) leads to NE learning in potential
games:
A. 8. (i) For each i there holds limn→∞Ni(n) = ∞; (ii) for all i, j there holds,
limn→∞
Ni(n)
Nj(n)
= 1. Part (i) in the above assumption ensures that players are active
in infinitely many rounds. Part (ii) ensures that the number of actions taken by each
player remain relatively close; effectively (ii) ensures that players obtain a weak form
of synchronization.
The following theorem is the main theoretical result of this Section. It shows that
under the above assumption, FP with asynchronous updates achieves NE learning. It
will be shown to follow as a consequence of the robustness result.
Theorem 7.1. Let Γ be a potential game. Let the action sequence {σ(n)}n≥1
be determined according to a FP process with asynchronous updates and assume A. 8
holds. Then players learn NE strategies in the sense that limn→∞ d(q(n), NE) = 0.
In order to prove Theorem 7.1 we will study an underlying (synchronous) FP
process that is embedded in the asynchronous FP process defined in (7.1). We begin
by presenting some additional definitions that allow us to study the embedded process.
10Let Xi(1) = 1, ∀i and let the initial action σi(1) be chosen arbitrarily for all i. Moreover, for
convenience in notation we have used an inclusion in (7.1). However, if Xi(n + 1) 6= 1, then the
inclusion should be interpreted as an equality: σi(n+ 1) = σi(n).
11Note that classical FP of Section 4.1 may be seen as a special case within this framework with
Xi(n) = 1, ∀i, n.
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In particular, for s ∈ N+ define the following terms:
τi(s) := sup{n ∈ N+ : Ni(n) ≤ s}, σ˜i(s) := σi(τi(s)), σ˜(s) := (σ˜1(s), . . . , σ˜N (s)),
q˜i(s) := qi(τi(s)), q˜(s) := (q˜1(s), . . . , q˜N (s)), qˆ
i
j(s) := qj(τi(s + 1) − 1), qˆ
i(s) :=
(qˆi1(s), . . . , qˆ
i
N (s)).
In words, the term τi(s) denotes the round number when player i is active for the
s-th time. The terms marked with a ∼ correspond to the embedded (synchronous)
FP process that we will study in the proof of Theorem 7.1.
When studying the embedded (synchronous) FP process {σ˜(s)}s≥1, it will be
important to characterize the terms to which players are best responding. With this
in mind, note that per (7.1), the action at time τi(s + 1) is chosen as σi(τi(s +
1)) ∈ argmaxαi∈Ai Ui(αi, q−i(τi(s + 1) − 1)). Thus, by construction, the (s + 1)-th
action of player i in the embedded (synchronous) FP process is chosen as σ˜i(s+ 1) ∈
BRi(qˆ
i
−i(s)). In the embedded (synchronous) FP process, the term q˜j(s) may be
thought of as the “true” empirical distribution of player j, and the term qˆij(s) may
be thought of as an estimate which player i maintains of q˜j(s), and the term qˆ
i(s)
(note the superscript) may be thought of as player i’s estimate of the joint empirical
distribution q˜(s) at the time of player i’s (s+1)-th best response. Loosely speaking, if
we can show that qˆi(s)→ q˜(s), ∀i, then convergence of the embedded process (q˜(s))
(and eventually the original process (q(n))) will follow from the robustness result.
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 7.1, we point out a few useful properties
that will arise in the proof. Note that for i ∈ N and s ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, we have
Ni(τi(s)) = s, (7.2)
and for i ∈ N and t ∈ {1, 2, . . .} we have
Xi(n) = 1 =⇒ τi(Ni(n)) = n. (7.3)
Furthermore, note that Xi(n) = 0 implies that Ni(n) = Ni(n− 1), and in particular,
Xi(n) = 0 =⇒ qi(n) = qi(n− 1). (7.4)
These facts are readily verified by conferring with the definitions of τi, Ni, and Xi.
We now prove Theorem 7.1.
Proof. As a first step, we wish to show that lims→∞ d(q˜(s), NE) = 0. We
accomplish this by invoking the robustness result. In particular, we wish to show that
there exists a sequence {ǫs}s≥1 such that lims→∞ ǫs = 0 and
Ui(σi(s+ 1), q˜−i(s)) ≥ max
yi∈Yi
Ui(αi, q˜−i(s))− ǫs, ∀s ≥ 1. (7.5)
To that end, for i ∈ N define vi : ∆−i → R by v(q−i) := maxyi∈Yi Ui(αi, q−i), and
note that by (7.1), Ui(σi(τi(s + 1)), q−i(τi(s + 1) − 1)) = vi(q−i(τi(s + 1) − 1)), or
equivalently by the definitions of σ˜(s) and qˆi(s),
Ui(σ˜i(s+ 1)), qˆ
i
−i(s)) = vi(qˆ
i
−i(s)).
Using Lemma A.1 in the appendix, it is straightforward to verify that lims→∞ ‖qˆi(s)−
q˜(s)‖ = 0. Since Ui is Lipschitz continuous, this gives lim
s→∞
|Ui(σ˜i(s + 1)), q˜−i(s)) −
vi(q˜−i(s))| = 0, ∀i; i.e., there exists a sequence {ǫs}s≥1 such that ǫs → 0 and (7.5)
holds. It follows by Corollary 1 that
lim
s→∞
d(q˜(s), NE) = 0. (7.6)
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We now show that limn→∞ d(q(n), NE) = 0. Let ε > 0 be given. By Lemma
A.1 (see appendix), for each i ∈ N there exists a time Si > 0 such that ∀s ≥ Si,
‖q(τi(s))− q˜(s)‖ <
ε
2 . Let S
′
= maxi{Si}. By (7.6) there exists a time S
′′
such that
∀s ≥ S
′′
, d(q˜(s), NE) < ε2 . Let S = max{S
′
, S
′′
}. Then
d(q(τi(s)), NE) < ε, ∀i, ∀s ≥ S. (7.7)
Let T = maxi{τi(S)}. Note that for some i, q(T ) = q(τi(S)), and hence by (7.7),
d(q(T ), NE) < ε. (7.8)
Also note that for any n0 > T , it holds that Ni(n0) ≥ S (since Ni(τi(S)) = S, and
Ni(n) is non-decreasing in n), and moreover
Xi(n0) = 1 for some i =⇒ q(n0) = q(τi(Ni(n0))),
Xi(n0) = 0 for all i =⇒ q(n0) = q(n0 − 1), (7.9)
where the first implication holds with Ni(n0) ≥ S. In the above, the first line follows
from (7.3), and the second line follows from (7.4). Consider n ≥ T . If for some
i, Xi(n) = 1, then by (7.9) and (7.7), d(q(n), NE) = d(q(τi(Ni(n))), NE) < ε.
Otherwise, if Xi(n) = 0 ∀i, then q(n) = q(n− 1).
Iterate this argument m times until either (i) Xi(n −m) = 1 for some i, or (ii),
t − m = T . In the case of (i), d(q(n), NE) = d(q(n − m), NE) = d(q(τi(Ni(n −
m))), NE) < ε, where the inequality again follows from (7.7) and the fact that
n−m > T =⇒ Ni(n−m) ≥ S. In the case of (ii), d(q(n), NE) = d(q(T ), NE) < ε,
where the inequality follows from (7.8). Since ε > 0 was arbitrarily, the result follows.
7.3. Continuous-Time Embedding of Fictitious Play. The asynchronous
FP algorithm discussed in Section 7.2 is a somewhat abstract discrete-time process. In
this section we give a concrete interpretation of the process within a practical setting.
In particular, we consider the implementation of the (discrete-time) FP algorithm in a
continuous-time setting where agents do not have access to a global clock. Effectively,
this results in a discrete-time asynchronous FP process embedded within a continuous-
time framework.
We first introduce the continuous-time embedding and derive a sufficient con-
dition for convergence using Theorem 7.1. Subsequently, we give two simple and
practical implementations that achieve the condition. The example implementations
are prototypical in that one uses a synchronization rule that is entirely stochastic,
and the other, entirely deterministic.
As in the the previous models of repeated play learning, assume each player
executes a (countable) sequence of actions (or strategies) {σi(n)}n≥1. Furthermore,
assume that each action is taken at some instant in real time t ∈ [0,∞) as measured by
some universal clock.12 In particular, for each player i, let {τi(n)}∞n=1 ⊂ [0,∞) be an
increasing sequence where τi(n) indicates the time (as measured by the universal clock)
at which player i chooses an action for the n-th time. Let σi(n) denote the n-th action
taken by player i; i.e., the action taken by player i at time t = τi(n). For t ∈ [0,∞),
12We use the term “universal clock” to refer to some reference clock by which we can compare the
timing of actions taken by individual players. However, the universal clock is merely an artifice for
analyzing the process, and we do not suppose that players have any particular knowledge concerning
it.
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let Ni(t) = sup{n : τi(n) ≤ t} denote the number of actions taken by player i by
time t. For t ∈ [0,∞), we define the empirical distribution of player i in this settings
as qi(t) :=
1
Ni(t)
∑Ni(t)
k=1 σi(k). In particular, for t ∈ [0,∞), let qi(t−) := limt˜↑t qi(t˜).
In this context, we say the sequence {σi(n)}n≥1 is an asynchronous FP action
process if for n ≥ 1 each player i chooses their stage-n action according to the rule:13
σi(n) ∈ BRi(q−i(τi(n)−))
We call the sequence {τi(n)}n≥1 the action-timing process for player i, and we refer
to any method used to generate {τi(n)}n≥1 (whether deterministic or stochastic) as
an action timing rule. Together, we refer to the joint sequence {τi(n), σi(n)}i∈N ,n≥1
as a continuous-time embedded FP process.
The following assumption provides a sufficient condition on the action-timing
process in order to ensure convergence of the continuous-time embedded FP process.
The assumption is essentially a restatement of A. 8, but in a continuous-time setting.
A. 9. (i) For each i there holds limt→∞Ni(t) = ∞, (ii) for each i, j there holds
limt→∞Ni(t)/Nj(t) = 1. Part (i) of the above assumption may be satisfied, for
instance, as long as the clock skew of each agent stays bounded (with respect to the
universal clock), and each agent takes actions infinitely often with respect to their local
clock. In order to ensure (ii) is satisfied, slightly more care is needed, as demonstrated
by the specific application scenarios below.
The following theorem demonstrates that if the action-timing sequence is chosen
to satisfy A. 9, then the continuous-time embedding of FP will converge to the set of
NE.
Theorem 7.2. Let Γ be a potential game. Suppose that {σi(n), τi(n)}i∈N , n≥1 is
a continuous-time embedding of FP satisfying A. 9. Then players learn NE strategies
in the sense that lim t→∞d(q(t), NE) = 0. The proof of Theorem 7.2 follows
readily from Theorem 7.1.
In the following two subsections, we give two simple examples of action-timing
rules that illustrate different methods for achieving A. 9 (and hence achieving NE
learning in the continuous-time embedded FP process).
7.4. Independent Poisson Clocks. Let wi(n) = τi(n + 1)− τi(n) denote the
stage n “waiting time” for player i. Suppose that for each player i and n ≥ 1, wi(n)
is an independent random variable with distribution wi(n) ∼ exp(λ), where λ > 0 is
some parameter that is common among all i. In this case, the action-timing process
{τi(n)}n≥1 is said to be a homogenous Poisson process.
The following theorem shows that if the action-timing process is randomly gen-
erated in this manner, then players will achieve NE learning.
Theorem 7.3. Let Γ be potential game. Suppose that players are engaged in a
continuous-time embedded asynchronous FP process and the action-timing sequences
{τi(n)}n≥1 are generated as independent homogenous Poisson processes with common
parameter λ. Then players learn NE strategies in the sense that lim
t→∞
d(q(t), NE) = 0,
almost surely.
Proof. By Theorem 7.1 it is sufficient to show that limt→∞Ni(t) = ∞, ∀i, and
limt→∞
Ni(t)
Nj(t)
= 1 for all i, j.
First, note that for any i and n ≥ 1, wi(n) < ∞ almost surely. Hence, τi(n) =∑n
k=1 wi(k) <∞ for all i, almost surely. Equivalently, for any M > 0, almost surely
13Let τi(1) = 0 for all i, and let the initial action σi(1) be chosen arbitrarily for all i.
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there exists a (random) time T > 0 such that Ni(t) ≥ M for all t ≥ T . Hence,
limt→∞Ni(t) =∞, almost surely.
Now we show that limt→∞
Ni(t)
Nj(t)
= 1 for all i, j. Let τ(1) := mini τi(1) and let
T1 := {τi(n)}i∈N ,n≥1\τ(1). For n ≥ 2, let τ(n) := min Tn−1 and let Tn := Tn−1\τ(n).
In this manner, we produce the sequence {τ(n)}. For n ≥ 1, i ∈ N , define Xi(n) ∈
{0, 1} to be an indicator variable with Xi(n) = 1 if τ(n) ∈ {τi(k)}k≥1 and Xi(n) = 0
otherwise.
Let F0 := ∅ and for n ≥ 1, let Fn := σ({τ(k)}nk=1). For n ≥ 1 let ξi(n) :=
P(Xi(n) = 1| Fn−1).
Since for each i, {τi(n)}n≥1 is a Poisson process with common parameter λ, there
holds ξi(n) =
1
N for all i and n.
14 By Levi’s extension of the Borel-Cantelli Lemma
(see [45], p.124) there holds
lim
n→∞
(
n∑
k=1
Xi(n))/(
n∑
k=1
ξi(n)) = 1, a.s. (7.10)
Note that for each i,
∑n
k=1Xi(k) = Ni(τ(n)) and
∑n
k=1 ξi(n) =
n
N . Thus by (7.10),
limn→∞
Ni(τ(n))
Nj(τ(n))
= limn→∞
Ni(τ(n))
n/N
n/N
Nj(τ(n))
= 1, a.s., ∀i, j.
Finally, note that limn→∞ τ(n) =∞ a.s., and for each i Ni(t) is constant on
[0,∞)\{τ(n)}n≥1. Thus, limt→∞
Ni(t)
Nj(t)
= 1, almost surely.
7.5. Adaptive Clock Rates. In this section we consider a scenario in which
each player chooses the timing of her actions (deterministically) according to a per-
sonal clock with a skew rate that may be different among players.
Let wi(n) = τi(n+ 1)− τi(n) again denote the stage n “waiting time” for player
i. For each i, let wi,0 denote a base waiting time for player i. The base waiting time
of player i may be interpreted as the amount of time which expires according to the
universal clock during one unit of time as measured by player i’s personal clock. The
disparity in the wi,0 thus reflects disparate skew rates among players’ personal clocks.
Let Nmin(t) := miniNi(t). At time t, we suppose that player i has knowledge of
Nmin(s) at the time instances s ∈ {kwi,0 : k ∈ N+, kwi,0 ≤ t}. (I.e., player i is aware
of the value of Nmin at instances when her “clock ticks”.) For each i, let Bi ∈ R be
a number satisfying Bi > maxi wi,0.
Suppose that player i adaptively chooses her stage n waiting time according to
the rule:
wi(n) = min
{
kwi,0 : k ∈ N+, Nmin(τi(n) + kwi,0) ≥ Ni(τi(n))−Bi
}
(7.11)
In words, this rule may be described as follows: Player i periodically observesNmin(t).
If Ni(t)−Nmin(t) ≤ Bi then player i takes a new action. If Ni(t)−Nmin(t) > Bi then
player i waits for Nmin(t) to increase sufficiently (satisfying Ni(t) − Nmin(t) ≤ Bi)
before taking a new action.
Theorem 7.4. Let Γ be a potential game. Suppose that players are engaged
in a continuous-time embedded asynchronous FP process in which the action-timing
sequence {τi(n)}n≥1 is generated according to the adaptive rule (7.11). Then players
learn NE strategies in the sense that limt→∞ d(q(t), NE) = 0.
Proof. By Theorem 7.1, it is sufficient to show that limt→∞Ni(t) = ∞ for some
(and hence all) i, and that limt→∞
Ni(t)
Nj(t)
= 1.
14Recall that N denotes the number of players.
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Note that for i∗ ∈ argmaxi wi,0, there holds Ni∗(t) = ⌊
t
wi∗,0
⌋ + 1, and hence
limt→∞Ni∗(t) = ∞. Furthermore, by construction, |Ni(t) − Ni∗(t)| ≤ 2maxiBi for
all i and for all t ≥ 0. Hence, limt→∞
Ni(t)
Nj(t)
= 1, for all i, j.
8. Concluding Remarks. We have studied the robustness of a class of best-
response based algorithms that we refer to as FP-type algorithms. It has been shown
that the convergence of such algorithms can be retained under a form of best-response
perturbation in which players are permitted to sometimes make errors in their best
response action, so long as the degree of suboptimality asymptotically decays to zero.
We have shown that this form of robustness can be used to develop practical algo-
rithms, including distributed algorithms, reduced-complexity algorithms, and asyn-
chronous algorithms.
Appendix A.
Lemma A.1. Let i, j ∈ N , let τi(s) and q˜j(s) be defined as in Section 7.2, and assume
A. 8 holds. Then lims→∞ ‖qj(τi(s))− q˜j(s)‖ = 0.
Proof. Note that by the definitions of τj , Nj , and q˜j there holds qj(n) = qj(τj(Nj(n))) =
q˜j(Nj(n)), for any n ∈ N+ Noting that
√
2 = maxp′,p′′∈∆(Yj) ‖p′ − p′′‖, we also have ‖q˜j(s+
1) − q˜j(s)‖ ≤
√
2
s
, for s ∈ N+, and more generally, for s1, s2 ∈ N+, we have ‖q˜j(s1) −
q˜j(s2)‖ ≤
∑max(s1,s2)−1
s=min(s1,s2)
‖q˜j(s + 1) − q˜j(s)‖ ≤ |s2−s1|min(s1,s2)
√
2. Hence, |qj(τi(s)) − q˜j(s)‖ =
‖q˜j(Nj(τi(s)))− q˜j(s)‖ = ‖q˜j(Nj(τi(s)))− q˜j(Ni(τi(s)))‖ ≤ |Nj(τi(s))−Ni(τi(s))|min(Ni(τi(s)),Nj(τi(s)))
√
2, where
the second equality follows from the fact that Ni(τi(s)) = s (see (7.2)). Thus, it suffices
to show that lim
s→∞
|Nj(τi(s))−Ni(τi(s))|
min(Ni(τi(s)),Nj(τi(s)))
= 0. But, by A. 8, for any i, j there holds: 0 =
limn→∞
Ni(n)
Nj(n)
− 1 = lims→∞ Ni(τi(s))Nj(τi(s)) − 1 = lims→∞
Ni(τi(s))−Nj (τi(s))
Nj(τi(s))
, where the second
equality follows from the fact that (again by A. 8) lims→∞ τi(s) =∞.
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